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The Prisoner’s Campaign: Felony Disenfranchisement 
Laws and the Right to Hold Public Office 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The 2002 race for Ohio’s 17th District congressional seat 
included three candidates: Democrat Tim Ryan of Niles, Ohio; 
Republican Ann Womer Benjamin of Aurora, Ohio; and 
Independent James A. Traficant Jr. of Federal Prison, Pennsylvania.1 
On April 9, 2002, Ohio Congressman James Traficant was convicted 
of ten counts of bribery, racketeering, filing false tax returns, and 
forcing aides to do chores around his Ohio farm.2 As a result of these 
convictions, on July 24, 2002, Traficant was kicked out of Congress 
by a vote of 420 to 1.3 On July 30, Traficant was sentenced to eight 
years in a federal prison in White Deer, Pennsylvania.4 Throughout 
the trial and congressional hearings, Traficant maintained his 
innocence and threatened to run for office from his prison cell. “I’m 
running,” he said, “and I wouldn’t be surprised if I’m elected from a 
jail cell because people know I got railroaded back here.”5 True to 
his word, Traficant was on the ballot when the citizens of Ohio went 
to the polls on November 5, 2002.6 Although Traficant was 
defeated, one looming question remains: had he been elected, could 
Traficant have legally taken his seat in Congress? 
 
 1. Tom Diemer & Martin Stolz, It’s Likely Traficant Can Run, Research Arm of 
Congress Says, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland), Aug. 16, 2002, at A2, available at 2002 WL 
6375648. 
 2. Traficant Guilty of Bribery, Racketeering (Apr. 12, 2002), at http:// 
www.cnn.com/2002/LAW/04 /11/traficant.trial/index.html. 
 3. Matt Smith et al., House Gives Traficant the Boot: Prison Might Be Next for Former 
Lawmaker (July 25, 2002), at http://www.cnn.com/2002/ALLPOLITICS/07/24/ 
traficant.expulsion/. The only vote against expulsion came from Representative Gary Condit of 
California. Id. 
 4. Associated Press, Traficant Gets 8 Years on Corruption Charge (July 30, 2002), at 
http://www. usatoday.com/news/nation/2002-07-30-traficant_x.htm. 
 5. Smith et al., supra note 3. 
 6. Ryan won the election with 51.14% of the vote. Benjamin came in second with 
33.67% of the vote, and Traficant received 15.19% of the vote. See OHIO SEC’Y OF STATE, 
VOTES FOR U.S. CONGRESS, at http://www.state.oh.us/sos/2002General/02GenUS 
Congressional.htm (last visited Apr. 18, 2003) (2002 election returns). 
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 Many Americans may not realize that jail time is not the only 
possible consequence of a felony conviction. Currently, millions of 
Americans are denied access to the polls under state laws that 
preclude convicted felons from voting. These state voter 
disenfranchisement7 laws have come under attack in recent years; 
opponents of the laws argue that they have an unconstitutional effect 
on the political process, including denying the vote to over ten 
percent of the African-American population.8 Along with voter 
disenfranchisement laws, many states have candidate 
disenfranchisement laws, which do not allow convicted felons to run 
for political office. This particular aspect of disenfranchisement laws 
has received little attention, but the 2002 Ohio congressional race 
had the potential to bring this issue to the forefront. 
An analysis of disenfranchisement laws reveals that, while 
Traficant could not have voted in an election or held a state-elected 
office in Ohio, he very likely could have represented the people of 
Ohio in the federal government. In other words, the State of Ohio 
can deny Traficant the right to vote for his representative in 
Congress, but it cannot keep him from being that representative. 
This perplexing result arises out of the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Qualifications Clauses of the Constitution.9 
While courts have consistently upheld voter disenfranchisement and 
state candidate disenfranchisement laws, Supreme Court precedent 
suggests that a convicted felon could run for federal office. However, 
the history and policy behind both voter and candidate 
disenfranchisement laws support federal candidate 
disenfranchisement laws as well. 
 
 7. For the purposes of this paper, “voter disenfranchisement” refers to laws denying a 
convicted felon the right to vote, “candidate disenfranchisement” refers to laws precluding a 
convicted felon from running for public office, and “felony disenfranchisement” or 
“disenfranchisement” alone refers to both types of laws. 
 8. Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1838, 1950–52 
(2002). 
 9. The Qualifications Clause for representatives provides: “No Person shall be a 
Representative who shall not have attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven 
Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that 
State in which he shall be chosen.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2. The Qualifications Clause for 
senators provides: “No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of 
thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when 
elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.” Id. § 3, cl. 3. 
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This paper compares the judicial interpretation of and the 
policies behind voter and candidate disenfranchisement laws. Part II 
summarizes the felony disenfranchisement laws of the fifty states and 
the District of Columbia. Part III reviews the judicial interpretation 
of those laws. Part IV analyzes whether Traficant could have taken 
office if elected, concluding that while Ohio law prohibits convicted 
felons from holding office, the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Constitution likely would allow a convicted felon to hold federal 
office. Part V analyzes the purposes behind voter and candidate 
disenfranchisement laws, asserting that policy may not support 
denying an ex-felon the right to vote after completion of the 
sentence but concluding that the states’ interest in protecting their 
citizens does support at least a partial ban on allowing ex-felons to 
hold public office. Part VI suggests a possible compromise to solve 
the disparity between voter and candidate disenfranchisement laws. A 
brief conclusion follows in Part VII. 
II. DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS 
Losing the right to vote as a result of a felony conviction and 
losing the right to hold public office as a result of that conviction are 
inextricably linked. Consequently, in order to understand the policies 
and implications of losing the right to hold public office, both 
aspects of felony disenfranchisement laws must be addressed. 
A. The Right to Vote 
Most states have some restriction on the right of convicted felons 
to vote. Maine and Vermont are the only states that have no 
restrictions, currently allowing felons to vote from prison.10 Fifteen 
states and the District of Columbia deny the right to vote only while 
the felon is in prison.11 The remaining states have varying degrees of 
disenfranchisement. Sixteen states disenfranchise both probationers 
and parolees.12 Four states disenfranchise parolees but not 
 
 10. SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED 
STATES (2002), http://www.sentencingproject.org/brief/pub1046.pdf. 
 11. Id. (Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Montana, 
New Hampshire, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, and Utah). 
 12. Id. (Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, West Virginia, 
and Wisconsin). 
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probationers.13 Thirteen states disenfranchise some categories of ex-
felons who have completed their sentences.14 Only eight of those 
thirteen states permanently disenfranchise first-time offenders, which 
means that voting rights can only be restored through a pardon or 
other order.15 
B. The Right to Hold Office 
State law regarding whether a convicted felon can run for office 
varies widely. However, the states can be grouped according to 
essential characteristics. 
1. States that do not deny the right to hold office 
Some states essentially do not bar convicted felons from running 
for office. For example, New York disenfranchises inmates and 
parolees, but the law does not pose any requirement that a candidate 
have a clean criminal record.16 Kansas law allows for forfeiture of 
public office upon conviction but does not explicitly preclude 
convicted felons from running.17 Other states included in this 
category are Vermont,18 Oregon,19 Tennessee,20 and Massachusetts.21 
 
 13. Id. (California, Colorado, Connecticut, and New York). 
 14. Id. Arizona and Maryland disenfranchise second-time offenders, but automatically 
restore voting rights to first-time offenders. Delaware disenfranchises some ex-felons for only 
five years. Tennessee and Washington no longer disenfranchise ex-felons, but after amending 
their laws, they failed to provide a way to restore voting rights to those disenfranchised under 
prior law. See Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons, supra note 8, at 1948–49. 
 15. SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 10. Those eight states are Alabama, Florida, 
Iowa, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nevada, Virginia, and Wyoming. 
 16. See N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 7 (amended 2001) (qualifications of a legislator are U.S. 
citizenship and residency in New York for five years). 
 17. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 25-2432 (2000). 
 18. Vermont only requires a candidate to get enough signatures to be put on the ballot. 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 2353 (2002). 
 19. Oregon law is unclear on whether convicted felons can run for office. A public 
officer can be removed from office for conviction, OR. REV. STAT. § 236.010 (2001), but does 
not seem to specifically require a candidate to be an eligible voter. But see id. § 249.020 
(2001) (“An eligible elector may become a candidate for nonpartisan office . . . .”). 
 20. Tennessee law is also unclear on whether convicted felons can run. See TENN. CODE 
ANN. § 40-20-112 (1996). 
 21. The Massachusetts constitution gives all citizens equal right to hold office. See 
MASS. CONST. pt. 1, art. IX. 
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2. States that automatically restore the right to hold office 
Three states simply require that the person’s sentence be 
completed before running for office. Hawaii law states, “A person 
sentenced for a felony, from the time of the person’s sentence until 
the person’s final discharge, may not . . . [b]ecome a candidate for or 
hold public office.”22 The other two states that automatically restore 
the right to hold office once a person’s sentence is completed are 
Montana23 and North Dakota.24 These states essentially grant a 
convicted felon the right to run for office immediately upon 
completion of the sentence. 
3. States that only restore the right to hold office after restoration of civil 
rights 
Eleven states require that in order to run for office, a felon must 
have received a pardon or otherwise have had his civil rights restored. 
For example, the Florida constitution states, “No person convicted 
of a felony . . . shall be qualified to vote or hold office until 
restoration of civil rights . . . .”25 Other states in this category include 
Idaho,26 Illinois,27 Iowa,28 Kentucky,29 Mississippi,30 North 
Carolina,31 Ohio,32 Texas,33 Utah,34 and Wisconsin.35 Procedures for 
having civil rights restored vary from state to state.36 
 
 22. HAW. REV. STAT. § 831-2(a)(2) (1993). 
 23. MONT. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
 24. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-33-01 (1997). 
 25. FLA. CONST. art. VI, § 4. 
 26. IDAHO CONST. art. VI § 3. 
 27. 10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/29-15 (West 1993). 
 28. IOWA CODE ANN. § 57.1(2)(c) (West 1999). 
 29. KY. CONST. § 150. 
 30. MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-35 (2000). 
 31. N.C. CONST. of 1970, art. VI, § 8. 
 32. OHIO CONST. art. V, § 4 (amended 1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2961.01 
(West 1997) (granting felons on probation or parole the right to vote but denying the right to 
hold public office unless restored by full pardon). 
 33. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 141.001 (Vernon 1986); see also TEX. CONST. of 1876, 
art. XVI, § 2 (laws shall be made to exclude felons from office). 
 34. UTAH CONST. art. IV, § 6. 
 35. WIS. CONST. art. XIII, § 3 (amended 1996). 
 36. See infra Part II.C. 
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4. States that link qualification for office to voter qualifications 
Seventeen states and the District of Columbia37 link the right to 
run for office directly to the right to vote. Thus, if the right to vote is 
automatically restored, so is the right to run for office. Maine, for 
example, requires the candidate to be a registered voter, but since 
inmates can vote, no one convicted of a felony is barred from 
running for office.38 Some states, on the other hand, do not 
automatically restore the right to vote. Arizona requires a candidate 
to be a qualified elector (voter),39 and a convicted felon in Arizona 
must go through certain procedures to have his right to vote 
restored.40 Other states linking qualification for office to voter 
qualifications include Alaska,41 California,42 Colorado,43 
Connecticut,44 Maryland,45 Michigan,46 Minnesota,47 Missouri,48 
Nebraska,49 Nevada,50 New Jersey,51 New Mexico,52 Virginia,53 
Washington,54 and Wyoming.55 In these states, the right to run for 
public office depends on whether the convicted felon is restored the 
right to vote. 
 
 37. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-1001.02(7), 1-1001.08(b)(1) (2001 & Supp. 2002). 
 38. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, § 333 (West 1993). 
 39. ARIZ. CONST. art VII, § 15. 
 40. See Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons, supra note 8, at 1948 n.74 (must 
wait two years and then have vote restored at discretion of judge). Arizona automatically 
restores the right to vote to first-time offenders. Id. at 1948. 
 41. ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.05.030, 15.25.030(a)(10) (Michie 2002). 
 42. CAL. CONST. of 1879, art. II, § 4 (amended 1974); CAL. ELEC. CODE § 201 (West 
1996). 
 43. COLO. CONST. art. VII, §§ 6, 10. 
 44. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 9-46, 9-46a (West 1989 & Supp. 2002). 
 45. MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW §§ 3-102, 5-203 (2002). 
 46. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 46.411 (West 1991) (amended 2002); id. § 168.51 
(West 1989). 
 47. MINN. CONST. art. VII, § 6. 
 48. MO. CONST. of 1945, art. III, §§ 4, 6. 
 49. NEB. REV. STAT. § 32-602 (1998). 
 50. NEV. CONST. art. II, § 1 (civil rights must be restored to vote); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. 281.040 (Michie 2001) (candidate must be a qualified elector). 
 51. N.J. CONST. of 1947, art. IV, § 1, para. 2. 
 52. N.M. CONST. art. VII, § 2. 
 53. VA. CONST. of 1971, art. II, §§ 1, 5. 
 54. WASH. CONST. art. II, § 7; id. art. VI, § 1 (amended 1974); id. art. VI, § 3 
(amended 1988). 
 55. WYO. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (amended 1996); id. § 15 (amended 1999). 
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5. States with a waiting period 
Five states add additional time requirements. Georgia, for 
example, requires a felon to have his civil rights restored and ten 
years to pass since the completion of the sentence.56 South Carolina 
law states that a felon cannot run for office until pardoned or until 
fifteen years after the completion of the sentence.57 Louisiana58 and 
Oklahoma59 have similar provisions. In Rhode Island, a felon cannot 
run for office until three years after the completion of the sentence, 
including probation and parole.60 
6. States that deny convicted felons the right to hold office 
Five states simply deny convicted felons the right to hold office. 
These states include Alabama,61 Arkansas,62 Delaware,63 Indiana,64 
and Pennsylvania.65 These states do not provide restoration of the 
right to hold office even if the right to vote is restored. 
7. Other states 
The final three states do not fall into any of the above categories. 
New Hampshire66 and West Virginia67 only deny the right to hold 
office to those convicted of bribery or treason in obtaining office.68 
South Dakota law is the most unique; it pertains only to a potential 
candidate who has been convicted of an “infamous crime,” and that 
 
 56. GA. CONST. art. II, § 2, para. 3. 
 57. S.C. CONST. art. VI, § 1. 
 58. LA. CONST. of 1974, art. I, § 10 (amended 1997). 
 59. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 5-105a (West 1997). 
 60. R.I. CONST. art III, § 2. Interestingly, in Rhode Island, anyone convicted of a 
misdemeanor resulting in jail time of six months or more is also subject to this rule. Id. 
 61. ALA. CODE § 36-2-1 (2001). 
 62. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-90-112(b) (Michie 1987). 
 63. DEL. CONST. of 1897, art. II, § 21. 
 64. IND. CODE ANN. § 3-8-1-5 (West 1997). 
 65. PA. CONST. art. II, § 7. 
 66. N.H. CONST. pt. 2, art. 96. 
 67. W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 6-5-5, 61-5A-9 (Michie 2000). 
 68. Other states have similar provisions for election law violations, but a discussion of 
those laws is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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convict merely needs to have “accounted for and paid over, 
according to law, all such moneys due from him.”69 
C. Restoring the Right to Vote 
The procedure for restoring a convicted felon’s right to vote or 
to hold public office varies from state to state. The varying 
complexity of these restoration schemes is important for convicted 
felons who wish to run for office because restoration of the right to 
run for office is often contingent on restoration of the right to 
vote.70 As noted above, some states, such as Alaska, automatically 
restore the right to vote upon completion of the sentence.71 Other 
states, such as Nevada, have a relatively simple restoration scheme. 
Nevada, while classified as a permanent disenfranchisement state, 
recently passed a law that restores the right to vote simply upon 
application, provided that the applicant has been released from 
prison.72 Alabama is an example of a complex restoration scheme. A 
convicted felon in Alabama must receive a pardon from the Board of 
Pardons and Paroles before his right to vote can be restored. Before 
applying for a pardon, the felon must have completed three years of 
parole, and even if a pardon is granted, the board must vote 
unanimously to restore the ex-felon’s voting rights.73 Some 
applicants must also provide a DNA sample to the Alabama 
Department of Forensic Sciences as part of the restoration process.74 
Complex procedures such as those in Alabama can mean that even 
though it is possible for an ex-felon to be restored the right to vote, 
the likelihood of success is slim.75 
III. JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS 
State voter disenfranchisement laws have been repeatedly 
challenged in the courts. The federal courts have addressed 
 
 69. S.D. CONST. art. III, § 4; see also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-30A-11 (Michie 1998) 
(person convicted of theft must have repaid debt). 
 70. See supra Part II.B. 
 71. ALASKA STAT. § 15.05.030 (Michie 2002). 
 72. Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons, supra note 8, at 1946. 
 73. Id. at 1944. 
 74. SENTENCING PROJECT, supra note 10. 
 75. Alabama has one of the highest disenfranchisement rates at 6.75% of the voting age 
population. Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons, supra note 8, at 1943–44. 
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numerous federal challenges under Section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.76 While 
the federal courts have never explicitly addressed state candidate 
disenfranchisement laws, an examination of the voter 
disenfranchisement cases gives some insight into the way federal 
courts might address the issue. Furthermore, state courts have 
interpreted federal court precedent to support state candidate 
disenfranchisement laws. 
A. Fourteenth Amendment Challenges 
In the most significant case dealing with voter 
disenfranchisement laws, the Supreme Court rejected a challenge 
brought under the Fourteenth Amendment.77 In Richardson v. 
Ramirez,78 three convicted felons challenged California’s laws 
disenfranchising persons convicted of a felony, claiming that the laws 
denied them the right to equal protection under the Constitution.79 
All three plaintiffs had been unable to register to vote because of 
their felony convictions.80 The Supreme Court found this equal 
protection challenge unique in that it implicated both Section 1 and 
the “less familiar” provisions of Section 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.81 Section 2 provides: 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States 
according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number 
of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the 
right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President 
and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in 
Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the 
members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male 
 
 76. Id. at 1949–50. 
 77. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 78. 418 U.S. 24 (1974). 
 79. Id. at 26–27, 29. 
 80. Id. at 32. 
 81. Id. at 42. Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment provides: 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities 
of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and 
citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for 
participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation 
therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of 
such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens 
twenty-one years of age in such State.82 
The Court examined the legislative history and found that 
“[t]hroughout the floor debates in both the House and the Senate, 
in which numerous changes of language in [Section] 2 were 
proposed, the language ‘except for participation in rebellion, or 
other crime’ was never altered.”83 The Court found that the 
legislative history suggested that this language was meant to include 
convicted felons, and furthermore stated that “[t]his convincing 
evidence of the historical understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is confirmed by the decisions of this Court which have 
discussed the constitutionality of provisions disenfranchising 
felons.”84 The Court concluded, “[Section] 1, in dealing with voting 
rights as it does, could not have been meant to bar outright a form 
of disenfranchisement which was expressly exempted from the less 
drastic sanction of reduced representation which [Section] 2 
imposed for other forms of disenfranchisement.”85 Thus, the 
California laws disenfranchising convicted felons were 
constitutional.86 After almost thirty years, the Richardson holding 
that voter disenfranchisement laws are constitutional under the 
Fourteenth Amendment is still valid.87 
 
 82. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 2 (emphasis added). 
 83. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 45. 
 84. Id. at 53. The Court cited the following cases: Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. 
of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 51 (1959) (“Residence requirements, age, previous criminal record 
are obvious examples indicating factors which a State may take into consideration in 
determining the qualifications of voters.” (citation omitted)); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 
(1890) (approving exclusion of bigamists and polygamists from the right to vote); Murphy v. 
Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885); Fincher v. Scott, 352 F. Supp. 117 (M.D.N.C. 1973); Beacham 
v. Braterman, 300 F. Supp. 182 (S.D. Fla. 1969) (affirming district court decisions rejecting 
constitutional challenges to state disenfranchisement laws).  
 85. Richardson, 418 U.S. at 55. 
 86. Id. at 56. 
 87. See Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons, supra note 8, at 1951–52. In 
Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222 (1985), the Court did invalidate an Alabama 
disenfranchisement regime because the laws had been enacted with discriminatory intent. This 
holding could be seen as contradictory to Richardson, but courts have read this decision to 
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B. Voting Rights Act Challenges 
Since Richardson all but foreclosed the possibility of challenging 
felony disenfranchisement laws under the Fourteenth Amendment, 
litigants have been turning to the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”)88 to 
challenge the laws under the theory of disparate impact. Section 2 of 
the VRA provides, in relevant part: 
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, 
practice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or 
political subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or 
abridgement of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote 
on account of race or color . . . . 
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, 
based on the totality of circumstances, it is shown that the political 
processes leading to nomination or election in the State or political 
subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a 
class of citizens protected by subsection (a) of this section in that its 
members have less opportunity than other members of the 
electorate to participate in the political process and to elect 
representatives of their choice. 89 
One of the most comprehensive cases dealing with the VRA is 
Baker v. Pataki,90 holding that the VRA did not apply to the 
plaintiffs’ claim.91 In Baker, the plaintiffs brought suit alleging that 
the New York law disenfranchising incarcerated felons deprived them 
of their voting rights under the VRA.92 The plaintiffs’ contention was 
that there was “evidence of race-based disparity in the State Courts’ 
conviction rate and sentence type,”93 thus violating the “results” 
standard of section 2 of the VRA.94 
The court examined prior VRA precedent and concluded that 
none of those cases supported the application of the VRA to the 
 
mean that “states may disenfranchise felons in any way they desire so long as they do not act 
on the basis of race.” Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons, supra note 8, at 1951–52. 
 88. Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973ff-6 (1994). 
 89. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a)–(b). 
 90. 85 F.3d 919 (2d Cir. 1996) (en banc), aff’g by an equally divided court Baker v. 
Cuomo, 842 F. Supp. 718 (S.D.N.Y 1993). 
 91. Id. at 921. 
 92. Id. at 923. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 924. 
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New York disenfranchisement law: “[F]elon disenfranchisement is a 
very widespread historical practice that has been accorded explicit 
constitutional recognition in [Section] 2 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.”95 In light of this recognition and the history of 
disenfranchisement laws, “it is unsurprising that when Congress 
enacted the Voting Rights Act in 1965, both Judiciary Committees 
affirmatively stated that felon disenfranchisement laws were not 
affected” by the provisions of the VRA, “including the prohibition 
on tests for ‘good moral character.’”96 The court found that voter 
disenfranchisement laws were “generally enacted for compelling, 
nondiscriminatory reasons”97 and thus did not “present the risk of 
discretionary and discriminatory application.”98 
The court also found that subjecting voter disenfranchisement 
laws to section 2 of the VRA would upset the balance of power 
between the states and the federal government. “[I]f Congress 
intends to alter the ‘usual constitutional balance between the States 
and the Federal Government,’ it must make its intention to do so 
‘unmistakably clear in the language of the statute.’”99 The court 
found that application of the VRA to voter disenfranchisement laws 
would upset the balance, reasoning that “an explicit constitutional 
balance has been struck by the mandate in [Section] 2 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment that the adverse consequence of reduced 
congressional representation shall not follow from the enactment and 
enforcement of state felon disenfranchisement statutes.”100 
Other cases have challenged disenfranchisement laws under the 
VRA, but so far, challengers have experienced little success.101 Even 
when courts have found that the VRA applies, the courts have 
required plaintiffs to show a causal connection between the 
disenfranchisement laws and the racial discrimination, which has yet 
 
 95. Id. at 928. 
 96. Id. at 929 (referring to provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) prohibiting application of 
a “test or device” that results in discrimination, i.e., literacy tests, education tests, or 
requirements of good moral character). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 930. 
 99. Id. at 931 (quoting Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1991)). 
 100. Id. 
 101. Developments in the Law—The Law of Prisons, supra note 8, at 1954. 
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to be done.102 Because of this precedent, future challenges of 
disenfranchisement laws under the VRA seem unlikely to succeed.103 
C. The Ban on the Right to Hold Public Office 
The Supreme Court has held that states can impose procedural 
limitations on who can appear on a ballot.104 The Court has 
recognized that “as a practical matter, there must be a substantial 
regulation of elections if they are to be fair and honest and if some 
sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany the democratic 
processes.”105 Such restrictions may infringe on a citizen’s right to 
vote or First Amendment right to freedom of association,106 but the 
states’ interests generally support the imposition of reasonable, 
nondiscriminatory restrictions.107 The Court has found that 
restrictions such as requiring a candidate to make a showing of 
substantial support108 or requiring a candidate to pay a filing fee109 
are reasonable restrictions. 
While the Supreme Court has never explicitly addressed the issue 
of whether candidate disenfranchisement laws are a reasonable ballot 
restriction, other courts have interpreted Supreme Court precedent 
to mean that states can preclude convicted felons from running for 
office. For example, the West Virginia Supreme Court, in 
considering whether term limits could be imposed on the Governor, 
recognized a difference between ballot restrictions that serve a valid 
 
 102. Id. at 1955. 
 103. But see id. at 1954 n.125 (“[T]wo pending cases offer opportunities for the first 
plaintiff ‘victories’ under Section 2.” (citing Farrakhan v. Locke, 987 F. Supp 1304 (E.D. 
Wash. 1997), appeal docketed, No. CS-96-076-RHW (9th Cir. Jan. 12, 2001); Johnson v. 
Bush, No. 00-3542-CIV-King (S.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2000))). Since Developments in the Law—
The Law of Prisons was written, however, the Florida district court heard the Johnson case and 
found that Florida’s disenfranchisement laws did not violate either the Constitution or the 
VRA. Johnson v. Bush, 214 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (S.D. Fla. 2002). 
 104. See, e.g., Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974). 
 105. Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983) (quoting Storer v. Brown, 415 
U.S. 724, 730 (1974)). 
 106. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 107. Anderson, 460 U.S. at 788. 
 108. Id. at 788 n.9 (citing Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971); Am. Party of Tex. v. 
White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974)). 
 109. See, e.g., Lubin, 415 U.S. at 709 (1974) (ruling that imposition of a filing fee, while 
generally permissible, was not permissible in this case because of the absence of an alternative 
means of gaining access to the ballot). 
STE-FIN 5/31/2003 1:28 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2003 
814 
public purpose and restrictions that do not.110 Restrictions that do 
not serve a valid public purpose are unconstitutional. Restrictions of 
the franchise that do serve a valid public purpose are: 
those which restrict its exercise only with regard to office seekers 
who fail to meet objective qualifications, established on a rational 
basis, in a valid attempt to insure wisdom, dignity, responsiveness, 
and competence in public officials. Examples of this type of 
limitation include requirements that candidates be of a certain age, 
not be under conviction for a felony, or be members of the bar.111 
The West Virginia court ruled that such provisions were 
constitutional.112 Other states have also upheld the ban on the right 
to hold office.113 However, such case law has only dealt with the ban 
as imposed on state officials. Because former Congressman James 
Traficant was running for United States Congress, he probably 
would not have been precluded from holding office despite his 
felony convictions. 
IV. TRAFICANT, OHIO LAW, AND SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT 
Despite the courts’ conclusions that state disenfranchisement 
laws are constitutional, James Traficant likely could have taken office 
if he had prevailed in the 2002 election. Under Ohio candidate 
disenfranchisement laws, Traficant could not have held a state office; 
however, Supreme Court precedent suggests that he could have held 
a federal office. 
A. Ohio Law 
The Ohio Constitution states: “The General Assembly shall have 
power to exclude from the privilege of voting, or of being eligible to 
 
 110. State ex rel. Maloney v. McCartney, 223 S.E.2d 607, 611 (W. Va. 1976), appeal 
dismissed sub nom. Moore v. McCartney, 425 U.S. 946 (1976). 
 111. Id. (emphasis added). 
 112. Id. at 612–13. 
 113. See, e.g., Cook v. Skipper, 749 So. 2d 6 (La. Ct. App. 1999); Mauney v. State ex rel. 
Moore, 707 So. 2d 1093 (Miss. 1998); State ex rel. Gains v. Thomas, 713 N.E.2d 1123 (Ohio 
Ct. App. 1998); Commonwealth ex rel. Baldwin v. Richard, 751 A.2d 647 (Pa. 2000); State v. 
Johnson, 79 S.W.3d 522 (Tenn. 2002); Swan v. LaFollette, 605 N.W.2d 640 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1999). 
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office, any person convicted of a felony.”114 The legislature exercised 
that power by enacting a statute which states: 
A person convicted of a felony under the laws of this or any other 
state or the United States, unless the conviction is reversed or 
annulled, is incompetent to be an elector or juror or to hold an 
office of honor, trust, or profit. When any person convicted of a 
felony under any law of that type is granted probation, parole, 
judicial release, or a conditional pardon or is released under a post-
release control sanction, the person is competent to be an elector 
during the period of probation, parole, or release or until the 
conditions of the pardon have been performed or have transpired 
and is competent to be an elector thereafter following final 
discharge. The full pardon of a convict restores the rights and 
privileges so forfeited under this section, but a pardon shall not 
release a convict from the costs of the convict’s conviction in this 
state, unless so specified.115 
Under this law, a convicted felon may vote while on probation or 
parole, but a convicted felon may not hold public office unless 
granted a full pardon.116 This section also applies to federal felony 
convictions.117 
Denial of the right to hold public office in Ohio was affirmed in 
State ex rel. Gains v. Thomas.118 In Thomas, the Mahoning County 
Prosecuting Attorney brought an action against a city councilman 
who had been elected to office. The councilman had been convicted 
ten years earlier of a federal drug crime and sentenced to eighteen 
months in prison.119 Citing the Ohio statute, the court granted the 
state’s motion for summary judgment and the councilman was 
removed from office.120 
Under Ohio law, Traficant could not hold public office. He had 
been convicted of a federal felony, and the Mahoning County Board 
of Elections had cancelled his voter registration.121 However, the 
Congressional Research Service, a branch of the Library of Congress, 
 
 114. OHIO CONST. art V, § 4 (amended 1976). 
 115. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2961.01 (West 1997). 
 116. See id. (commentary). 
 117. See State ex rel. Corrigan v. Barnes, 443 N.E.2d 1034 (Ohio Ct. App. 1982). 
 118. 713 N.E.2d 1123 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998). 
 119. Id. at 1123. 
 120. Id. at 1123–24. 
 121. Diemer & Stolz, supra note 1. 
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submitted a report that said Traficant would likely be able to run for 
Congress, citing only three qualifications: age, residency, and 
citizenship.122 This disparity arises from the difference between 
running for state office and running for federal office. Since Traficant 
was running for Congress, it is possible that, despite Ohio law, he 
could have taken office if elected.123 
B. Qualifications for United States Congress 
The United States Constitution sets out only three qualifications 
to be elected to the United States Congress: age, residency, and 
citizenship.124 The Constitution also provides that “Each House shall 
be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own 
Members.”125 The Supreme Court has interpreted these provisions to 
mean that states cannot add qualifications to members of Congress. 
In U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton,126 the Supreme Court 
struck down an amendment to the Arkansas Constitution “that 
prohibit[ed] the name of an otherwise-eligible candidate for 
Congress from appearing on the general election ballot if that 
candidate ha[d] already served three terms in the House of 
Representatives or two terms in the Senate.”127 The Court held “that 
the Framers intended the Constitution to be the exclusive source of 
qualifications for Members of Congress . . . .”128 
In coming to this conclusion, the Court relied heavily on Powell 
v. McCormack.129 In Powell, the Court ruled that a duly elected 
member could not be excluded from Congress because of prior 
misconduct while in office. Based on findings that Powell had 
wrongfully diverted House funds for his own use and had made false 
reports while serving in the Eighty-ninth Congress, the Ninetieth 
 
 122. Id. Traficant’s residency was in question, since he was serving time in Pennsylvania, 
but the report indicated that Traficant would likely still qualify since he maintained a residence 
in Ohio. Id. 
 123. How Traficant would have been able to fulfill his duties as a Congressman while in 
federal prison is another question which is beyond the scope of this article. 
 124. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3. 
 125. Id. § 5. 
 126. 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
 127. Id. at 783. 
 128. Id. at 800–01. 
 129. 395 U.S. 486 (1969). 
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Congress refused to seat Powell and declared his seat vacant.130 The 
Court ruled that “Congress has no power to alter the qualifications 
in the text of the Constitution.”131 The Thornton Court approved 
the historical analysis presented by the Powell Court and further 
added: 
We noted that allowing Congress to impose additional 
qualifications would violate that “fundamental principle of our 
representative democracy . . . ‘that the people should choose whom 
they please to govern them.’” 
 Our opinion made clear that this broad principle incorporated at 
least two fundamental ideas. First, we emphasized the egalitarian 
concept that the opportunity to be elected was open to all. We 
noted in particular Madison’s statement in The Federalist that 
“‘[u]nder these reasonable limitations [enumerated in the 
Constitution], the door of this part of the federal government is 
open to merit of every description, whether native or adoptive, 
whether young or old, and without regard to poverty or wealth, or 
to any particular profession of religious faith.’”132 
In Thornton, the Court found that not only could Congress not 
add to the qualifications for office, the states could not either. The 
Court rejected the argument that the power to add qualifications was 
reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment, reasoning that 
“no such right existed before the Constitution was ratified.”133 The 
Court then found that even if the states possessed some control over 
qualifications as part of their original powers, “the text and structure 
of the Constitution, the relevant historical materials, and, most 
importantly, the ‘basic principles of our democratic system’ all 
 
 130. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 788–89. 
 131. Id. at 789 (quoting Powell, 395 U.S. at 522). It must be noted here that the Powell 
Court emphasized that they were only dealing with exclusion, not expulsion. Thornton, 514 
U.S. at 789 n.5. While it appears from the Powell decision that Congress could not have 
refused to seat Traficant had he been elected, it is likely that it could have seated Traficant and 
then expelled him according to the provisions of Article I, § 5: “Each House may determine 
the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the 
Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2. The decision to 
expel Traficant was based on his violation the Code of Official Conduct. H.R. REP. NO. 107-
594, vol. 1, at 1 (2002). The Code of Official Conduct is House Rule XXIII and is available at 
http://www.house.gov/rules/ RXXIII.htm. 
 132. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 793–94 (quoting Powell, 395 U.S. at 540 n.74 (quoting THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 52 (James Madison))). 
 133. Id. at 803. 
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demonstrate that the Qualifications Clauses were intended to 
preclude the States from exercising any such power and to fix as 
exclusive the qualifications in the Constitution.”134 
Under the rationale of Thornton, states could not require their 
federal officers to have a clean criminal record. Indeed, a few states 
have explicitly recognized this limitation.135 The Supreme Court has 
left the states with two divergent principles: the principles of 
federalism and the history of the Constitution give the states the 
ability to deny a convicted felon the right to vote136 or to hold state 
office,137 but those same principles and history also declare that states 
cannot deny a convicted felon the right to run for federal office. In 
other words, the State of Ohio can deny Traficant the right to vote 
for his representative in Congress, but it cannot keep him being that 
representative. However, analyzing the purposes of 
disenfranchisement laws leads to the conclusion that the state has an 
even greater interest in denying a convicted felon the right to hold 
office than in denying a convicted felon the right to vote. 
V. PURPOSE OF DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS 
The four generally recognized purposes of punishment are 
deterrence, rehabilitation, retribution, and incapacitation. While the 
purposes of deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution do not 
adequately justify disenfranchisement laws, incapacitation provides 
some insight into the justification behind these laws. As the 
following discussion will illustrate, the justifications behind voter 
disenfranchisement laws have weaknesses. Despite these problems, 
however, states have still chosen to enact these laws. Consequently, 
these arguments provide an even more compelling justification for 
candidate disenfranchisement laws. 
 
 134. Id. at 806. 
 135. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 3-8-1-5 (West 1997) (provision that convicted felon 
cannot run for office does not apply to federal office); MD. CODE ANN., ELEC. LAW § 5-203 
(2002) (requirement that candidate be a qualified voter does not apply to candidates for 
federal office). 
 136. See supra Part III.A (discussing Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974)). 
 137. See supra Part III.C. 
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A. Deterrence 
Deterrence is not likely one of the main purposes of 
disenfranchisement laws.138 Deterrence is generally separated into 
two categories: “Punishment acts as a general deterrent insofar as the 
threat of punishment deters potential offenders in the general 
community. It acts as a specific deterrent insofar as the infliction of 
punishment on convicted defendants leaves them less likely to engage 
in the crime.”139 Losing the right to vote is unlikely to act as a 
general deterrent since most citizens probably are not aware that 
they can lose the right to vote if convicted of a felony, and even if 
the citizen was aware, it is doubtful that it would be a major concern 
to the person about to commit a felony. Losing the right to vote 
cannot act as a specific deterrent in those states that permanently 
disenfranchise convicted felons because the right to vote has already 
been lost. In those states that disenfranchise offenders until 
completion of their sentence, it is unlikely that losing the right to 
vote would be more of a specific deterrent than the threat of more 
prison time. With regard to deterrence, the right to vote and the 
right to hold public office are indistinguishable. The threat of losing 
the right to hold public office would likely only deter someone who 
knows about that particular consequence and plans to be a career 
politician. 
B. Rehabilitation 
Rehabilitation is certainly not one of the purposes behind felony 
disenfranchisement laws. Rehabilitation is “the purposeful reduction 
or elimination of an offender’s subsequent criminal behavior through 
a program of planned intervention.”140 While someone who has been 
convicted of a felony may regret the loss of his or her civil rights (as 
evidenced by the litigation attempting to restore the right to vote), 
the loss of the right to vote or the right to hold public office 
probably would not be a principle motivation for reform. 
 
 138. See Steven B. Snyder, Note, Let My People Run: The Rights of Voters and Candidates 
Under State Laws Barring Felons from Holding Elective Office, 4 J.L. & POL. 543, 571–72 
(1988). 
 139. SANFORD H. KADISH & STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS 
PROCESSES: CASES AND MATERIALS 116 (7th ed. 2001). 
 140. Richard D. Schwartz, Rehabilitation, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 
1364, 1364 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983). 
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C. Retribution 
The theory of retribution applies equally to both the right to 
vote and the right to hold public office. The main theory behind 
retributive punishment is that “someone who has violated the rights 
of others should be penalized, and punishment restores the moral 
order that has been breached by the original wrongful act.”141 
Retribution is also seen in terms of fairness to the law-abiding 
citizen.142 Under John Locke’s concept of the social compact, “[a] 
man who breaks the laws he has authorized his agent to make for his 
own governance could fairly have been thought to have abandoned 
the right to participate in further administering the compact.”143 
Under the retributive theory of punishment, those who break the 
law should not be allowed to participate in making the law, whether 
as a voter or as a political officer. However, this theory may not 
provide justification for denying the right to vote or hold public 
office after completion of the prison sentence. In those eight states 
with lifetime voter disenfranchisement,144 conviction of a crime 
classified as a felony can mean permanent loss of the right to vote, no 
matter how long the sentence.145 As one commentator has noted, “a 
criminal sentence must be proportionate to the crime for which the 
defendant has been convicted,” and “[p]ermanent disqualification 
does appear excessive for one felonious infraction.”146 
D. Incapacitation 
While incapacitation provides the most compelling justification 
for disenfranchisement laws, it arguably provides a more compelling 
justification for candidate disenfranchisement than for voter 
disenfranchisement. Incapacitation “refers to the crimes averted in 
the general society by isolation of the identified offenders during 
 
 141. Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE, supra 
note 140, at 1336, 1338. 
 142. Id. at 1339. 
 143. Green v. Bd. of Elections of N.Y., 380 F.2d 445, 451 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 
389 U.S. 1048 (1968). 
 144. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
 145. For example, a person convicted of a minor felony at age eighteen who then lives to 
the age of eighty has actually received a sixty-two-year sentence. However, those in favor of 
retributive punishment may argue that such a denial is justified. 
 146. Snyder, supra note 138, at 572 (citing Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983)). 
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their periods of incarceration.”147 In the case of felony 
disenfranchisement laws, the isolation can continue after the period 
of incarceration is over. Still, this accords with the rationale behind 
incapacitation. The idea is that the convicted felon be removed from 
the political process. As the Second Circuit recognized: 
[I]t can scarcely be deemed unreasonable for a state to decide that 
perpetrators of serious crimes shall not take part in electing the 
legislators who make the laws, the executives who enforce these, 
the prosecutors who must try them for further violations, or the 
judges who are to consider their cases.148  
However, as discussed below, there is little evidence that giving a 
convicted felon the right to vote will harm the political process. 
One justification for removing a convicted felon from the 
political process is to protect against voter fraud.149 “Supporters of 
disenfranchisement argue that because an ex-felon has shown a 
propensity to break the law, they are also more likely to violate 
particular prohibitions against election fraud.”150 However, there is 
no evidence to show that someone convicted of a felony—a drug 
crime, for example—is more likely than the average citizen to 
commit voter fraud.151 
Another justification is to prevent harmful changes to the law.152 
“The advocates for disenfranchisement believe that most, if not all, 
ex-felony offenders would vote to weaken the content and 
administration of criminal laws.”153 Once again, however, there is no 
evidence that this would occur. Just because someone has been 
convicted of one felony does not mean they will continue to commit 
crimes, and it does not mean that the ex-felon will automatically vote 
to weaken the criminal law.154 
 
 147. Alfred Blumstein, Incapacitation, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE, 
supra note 140, at 873–74. 
 148. Green, 380 F.2d at 451. 
 149. Tanya Dugree-Pearson, Comment, Disenfranchisement–A Race Neutral Punishment 
for Felony Offenders or a Way to Diminish the Minority Vote?, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 
359, 385 (2002). 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. at 386. 
 152. Id. at 387. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 387–88. 
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A third justification for denying the right to vote is to protect the 
purity of the ballot box.155 Like the Second Circuit, many courts 
have argued that a convicted felon does not possess the requisite 
moral character to vote responsibly.156 But as one commentator has 
noted, “[t]he ‘purity of the ballot box’ argument is nothing more 
than a moral competency argument to support the idea that the 
franchise should be limited to people who will ‘vote right.’”157 
Denying a convicted felon the right to vote can be justified as 
punishment until the completion of the period of incarceration or 
even until the completion of probation or parole, but the 
justification diminishes after the sentence has been completed. There 
is no evidence that convicted felons are banding together to debase 
the election process or undermine the criminal law. If a convicted 
felon were using his or her vote to try to make harmful changes in 
society, that one vote would be overshadowed by the votes of law-
abiding, responsible citizens. The arguments for incapacitation, or 
removal from the political process, simply do not adequately justify 
voter disenfranchisement beyond completion of the sentence, let 
alone voter disenfranchisement for life. Most states seem to have 
recognized this argument, since only eight states permanently 
disenfranchise voters for life.158 Yet states have chosen to enact voter 
disenfranchisement laws despite the weaknesses in the policy 
arguments. This fact provides an even more compelling justification 
for candidate disenfranchisement laws. 
 The theory behind incapacitation may provide the most 
convincing policy arguments in favor of candidate 
disenfranchisement. Moral character in our elected officials is 
arguably more important than the character of the voters. The 
Delaware Supreme Court discussed this justification: 
In our view, [the provision of the Delaware Constitution banning 
convicted felons from office] is essentially a character provision, 
mandating that all candidates for State office possess high moral 
qualities. It is not a provision designed to punish an offender. 
While conviction of an infamous crime does not imply than [sic] an 
offender is incapable of functioning as a respected and productive 
 
 155. Id. at 390. 
 156. Id. at 390, 390 n.210. 
 157. Id. at 391 (citations omitted). 
 158. See supra note 15. 
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member of society, it is irreversible evidence that the offender does 
not possess the requisite character for public office. It is important 
to emphasize that we are not concerned here with the standard of 
compassion which should govern daily interpersonal relationships. 
We deal, rather, with a norm established by our Constitution for 
those who seek to govern us. Without question, it is a demanding 
norm.159 
The concern here is not that one voter will use his or her vote to 
weaken society, it is that one voter who represents thousands of 
citizens will use that vote to make laws that weaken society. This 
justification is not simply a concern, as one commentator has 
suggested, “that ex-felons will not do the job right.”160 Rather, it is 
an expression of the state’s interest in protecting its citizens. “The 
State has a valid interest in ensuring that the rules of its society are 
made by those who have not shown an unwillingness to abide by 
those rules.”161 Such restrictions on who can hold state office have 
been repeatedly upheld by courts,162 but the results in Powell and 
Thornton would suggest that such limitations would not be upheld 
for candidates for federal office. However, the history of the 
Constitution and the policies attendant to the rule might be 
interpreted to suggest the opposite outcome. 
In Powell and Thornton, the Supreme Court relied heavily on the 
statements of the founding fathers and the history of the 
Constitution to come to the decision that neither Congress nor the 
states can add to those qualifications of members of Congress 
enumerated in the Constitution.163 However, constitutional history 
would suggest that the framers might have considered a felony 
conviction a bar to holding federal office. 
In Thornton, the Court quoted Madison’s statement in The 
Federalist No. 57: 
Who are to be the objects of popular choice? Every citizen whose 
merit may recommend him to the esteem and confidence of his 
country. No qualification of wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or 
 
 159. State ex rel. Wier v. Peterson, 369 A.2d 1076, 1080–81 (Del. 1976). 
 160. Snyder, supra note 138, at 566. 
 161. Tex. Supporters of Workers World Party Presidential Candidates v. Strake, 511 F. 
Supp. 149, 153 (S.D. Tex. 1981). 
 162. See supra Part III.C. 
 163. See supra Part IV.B. 
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of civil profession is permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint 
the inclination of the people.164 
The key word in this passage is “merit.” Further examination of 
Madison’s writing makes clear that the merit of those who 
represented the people was of utmost concern. Representatives 
ought to be “men who possess most wisdom to discern, and most 
virtue to pursue, the common good of the society,” and that the 
government should “take the most effectual precautions for keeping 
them virtuous whilst they continue to hold their public trust.”165 In 
listing qualifications that should not be considered—wealth, birth, 
and profession—Madison may have been addressing the concern that 
the legislature of the new nation not be like the government of 
Britain, which favored “the pretensions of rank and wealth.”166 This 
concern, as well as the focus on merit, suggests that Madison may 
not have intended to include a felony conviction in his list of 
qualifications that should not be considered. 
The historical discussion of the Fourteenth Amendment 
provided by the Court in Richardson provides a further basis for the 
argument that convicted felons should not be allowed to hold office. 
The Court found that the text and history of Section 2 supported 
the disenfranchisement of citizens who had committed a felony.167 
Just a few years earlier, the Second Circuit had recognized that 
“eleven state constitutions adopted between 1776 and 1821 
prohibited or authorized the legislature to prohibit exercise of the 
franchise by convicted felons. Moreover, twenty-nine states had such 
provisions when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, and the 
total has now risen to forty-two [now forty-eight].”168 This history 
suggests that the framers would have recognized voter 
disenfranchisement as proper. However, as Justice Thomas, in his 
dissent in Thornton, recognized: 
Today’s decision also means that no State may disqualify 
congressional candidates whom a court has found to be mentally 
incompetent, who are currently in prison, or who have past vote-
 
 164. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 819 (1995). 
 165. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 365 (James Madison) (Robert Scigliano ed., Random 
House Inc. 2000). 
 166. Id. at 369. 
 167. Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 43–54 (1974). 
 168. Green v. Bd. of Elections of N.Y., 380 F.2d 445, 450 (2d Cir. 1967). 
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fraud convictions. Likewise, after today’s decision, the people of 
each State must leave open the possibility that they will trust 
someone with their vote in Congress even though they do not trust 
him with a vote in the election for Congress.169 
It seems implausible that the framers would have supported taking 
away an ex-felon’s right to vote for his representative while allowing 
an ex-felon to be the representative. 
In his dissent, Justice Thomas found troubling the majority’s 
assumption that the Qualifications Clauses170 were meant to be 
exclusive. He argued that the “logical conclusion” drawn from the 
evidence was “simply that the Framers did not want the people of 
the States and their state legislatures to be constrained by too many 
qualifications imposed at the national level.”171 Justice Thomas 
found that the majority’s conclusion—that the rule that Congress 
could not add qualifications means that states could not add 
qualifications—was an incorrect interpretation of the Constitution.172 
Using a different analysis of history, Justice Thomas rejected the 
majority’s argument that “restrictions on eligibility for office are 
inherently undemocratic” and concluded that “the Qualifications 
Clauses themselves prove that the Framers did not share this view; 
eligibility requirements to which the people of the States consent are 
perfectly consistent with the Framers’ scheme.”173 Under Justice 
Thomas’s interpretation, the Qualifications Clauses and the 
Constitution do support a state’s right to preclude convicted felons 
from running for office.174 
 
 169. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 917 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
Justice Thomas was joined in his dissent by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor, and 
Justice Scalia. Id. at 845. 
 170. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 3, 5. 
 171. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 875 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 172. Id. at 875–85. It could be argued that Congress can add qualifications to its 
members as a result of the expulsion power contained in Article I, § 5 of the Constitution. This 
Section appears to give Congress the power to expel a member for any reason as long as there 
is a two-thirds vote. See supra note 131. 
 173. Id. at 878–79. 
 174. A footnote in the Thornton decision suggests that the Qualifications Clauses may 
include more that just age, residency, and citizenship: 
 “In addition to the three qualifications set forth in Art. I, § 2, Art. I, § 3, cl. 7, 
authorizes the disqualification of any person convicted in an impeachment 
proceeding from ‘any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States’; Art. 
I, § 6, cl. 2, provides that ‘no Person holding any Office under the United States, 
shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office’; and § 3 of the 
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Ultimately, however, Justice Thomas’ argument did not win the 
day. In Thornton, the majority repeatedly emphasized the principle 
that “the people should choose whom they please to govern 
them.”175 Followers of this principle would suggest that democratic 
principles mandate that if people want to elect a convicted felon they 
should be allowed to do so.176 Yet others would argue that 
“notwithstanding representative government, the people [do] not 
have the right to ‘destroy their own liberties, by filling Congress with 
men who, from their conduct, show themselves capable of the 
destruction of the Government.’”177 While it may be true that 
responsible citizens are presumed to vote for the best representative, 
that assumption is perhaps belied by the Ohio congressional race. 
Traficant, who had been convicted of corruption while in office, 
received a somewhat surprising fifteen percent of the vote in Ohio’s 
17th District.178 While those citizens may have had legitimate reasons 
for voting for Traficant, the state legislature, elected by the people, 
arguably has “the right to protect citizens from their own bad 
choices.”179 The Committee on Standards of Official Conduct, the 
congressional committee assigned to investigate and recommend 
 
14th Amendment disqualifies any person ‘who, having previously taken an oath . . . 
to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection 
or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof.’ It has 
been argued that each of these provisions, as well as the Guarantee Clause of Article 
IV and the oath requirement of Art. VI, cl. 3, is no less a ‘qualification’ within the 
meaning of Art. I, § 5, than those set forth in Art. I, § 2.” 
Id. at 787 n.2 (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 520 n.41 (1969)). The Court 
continued: 
  In Powell, we saw no need to resolve the question whether those additional 
provisions constitute “qualifications,” because “both sides agree that Powell was not 
ineligible under any of these provisions.” We similarly have no need to resolve that 
question today: Because those additional provisions are part of the text of the 
Constitution, they have little bearing on whether Congress and the States may add 
qualifications to those that appear in the Constitution. 
Id. at 787–88 n.2 (quoting Powell, 395 U.S. at 520 n.41). If the history and text of both the 
Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment would support precluding convicted felons from 
holding public office, it could be said that this preclusion is also part of the Qualifications 
Clauses. Admittedly, this would be a novel approach for a court to take. 
 175. Id. at 793 (citations omitted). 
 176. See Snyder, supra note 138. 
 177. ABNER J. MIKVA & ERIC LANE, LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 466 (2d ed. 2002) (quoting 
Congressman John A. Logan in opposition to the seating of Whittemore, a representative-elect 
who had been charged with selling admissions to military academies). 
 178. See OHIO SEC’Y OF STATE, supra note 6. 
 179. MIKVA & LANE, supra note 177, at 473. 
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sanctions for Traficant’s misconduct, cited a “need to preserve public 
confidence in the legislative process when a Member of Congress has 
been convicted of ten felony offenses relating directly to his misuse 
of public office.”180 Nowhere is the need to preserve public 
confidence in the legislative process more important than in the 
national legislature, yet states’ ability to preserve this public 
confidence is diminished since they have no control over who can be 
elected to Congress. 
VI. POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS 
Allowing states to prohibit convicted felons from holding office 
would likely require the Supreme Court to overrule Thornton, a step 
that the Court would not take lightly. However, since Thornton was 
a five-to-four decision, as the composition of the Court changes, the 
views of the Court could change as well. Since Thornton dealt with 
term limits rather than disenfranchisement, the Court could also 
simply distinguish Thornton. Change in this area could also come 
from a constitutional amendment allowing the states to impose 
federal candidate disenfranchisement laws.181 Such an amendment 
would require a careful examination of the policies behind such a 
rule. 
The weaknesses in the policies behind voter disenfranchisement 
laws suggest that a lifetime ban on the ability of ex-felons to vote 
may not be justified.182 Consequently, those policies probably do not 
support a lifetime ban on the ability to run for public office. It does 
seem harsh to penalize someone for life for one mistake or one 
moment of foolishness. It must be recognized that a prior felony 
conviction does not necessarily mean that a person would not be a 
good representative.183 The states’ interest in protecting their citizens 
and the citizens’ interest in electing whomever they choose would 
probably be adequately served by additional time requirements such 
as those imposed by Georgia, Oklahoma, South Carolina, and 
Louisiana.184 Requiring someone convicted of a felony to wait ten or 
fifteen years after the completion of the sentence before running for 
 
 180. H.R. REP. NO. 107-594, vol. 1, at 125 (2002). 
 181. See U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 837 (1995). 
 182. See supra Part V.D. 
 183. See Snyder, supra note 138. 
 184. See supra Part II.B.5. 
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office would allay fears that the person might commit another felony 
while ensuring that a citizen who is otherwise qualified to be a good 
representative is not forever banned from office. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
While the Supreme Court has ruled that state felony 
disenfranchisement laws are constitutional, as the law now stands, a 
state cannot prevent a convicted felon from representing its citizens 
in the United States Congress. While this perplexing situation may 
have been avoided by James Traficant’s defeat in the 2002 election, 
the issue may arise in the future. If the issue does arise, we will be 
forced to deal with two competing concerns: first, the right of the 
people to elect the person of their choice, and second, the right of 
the state to protect its citizens from making a potentially harmful 
choice. The Supreme Court has declared that the principles of 
democracy favor the first concern. However, if the policy 
considerations behind voter disenfranchisement laws are legitimate, 
the application of those considerations would be even more 
important in the case of candidate disenfranchisement. As evidenced 
by state candidate disenfranchisement laws, many states have made 
the decision that moral character is important in elected officials. 
However, unless the current law changes, states are not allowed to 
make that decision with regard to their federal officials. Thus, we will 
have to continue to hope that the citizens of every state will exercise 
their right to vote in a responsible manner to preserve the 
“fundamental principles of our representative democracy.”185 
Andrea Steinacker 
 
 185. Thornton, 514 U.S. at 795 (quoting Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 547 
(1969)). 
